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 Originating with the gabelle taxes of France during the close of the Albigensian 
Crusades, excise taxes and regulations on consumer products have historically been used 
by local and federal governments to generate revenue during periods of war. Following 
the enactment of the Internal Revenue Act on June 30, 1864, the United States extended 
their definition of consumer products to include cigarettes and other tobacco products. 
The United States Federal government justifies cigarette taxes as a method not only to 
discourage the habit of smoking but also to recover the costs of the negative externalities 
associated with the “sinful” behavior. Through an analysis of price elasticities as well as 
individual state taxation and cigarette consumption data, this thesis attempts to explain 
why increased prices of cigarettes due to excise taxes are not effective deterrents for 
smokers without additional enforcement of tax-avoidant behaviors.  
 The first section of this study defines excise taxation through historical and 
contemporary theories. In addition, the analysis chronologically reviews the history of 
excise taxation and regulation, including those imposed on cigarette and tobacco, in the 
United States. This chronological review also highlights the evolution of government 
policy and the acceptability of cigarette consumption in the United States.  
 The second section analyzes tobacco taxation in the United States during the year 
2015. The section begins with an overview of the federal governments’ tobacco taxation 
policies in the nation. The section concludes with a review of differing taxation rates in 
individual states. The conclusion introduces factors that affect smoking behavior, which 
will be used in the proceeding econometric analyses.  
!!
2 
 The third section uses an econometric analysis, conducted by John Lovell Jarvis 
at Wesleyan University, to explain the price elasticity of cigarettes and the impact of tax-
induced prices on annual per capita cigarette consumption. The fourth section also 
illustrates a differing explanation of price elasticity from the perspective of tobacco 
companies.  
 The final section studies the impact of cigarette taxation in the state of New York 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of cigarette excise taxes. The section 
explores the increases in tax-avoidant behaviors and additional legislation that affect 
cigarette consumption in New York and the United States as a whole. Using the results 
from these studies, the conclusion section discusses the effects of cigarette taxation and 
















DEFINITIONS RELATING TO EXCISE TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
Although it is not considered a technical term in economics, a “sin” tax is a form 
of state or local-sponsored excise tax with statutory meaning. According to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), excise taxes are inland taxes on the “sale, or production for sale, 
of specific goods” (IRS, 2015). Furthermore, in the United States, excise taxes are 
indirect-event taxes, which are paid by the producer or seller at the time of sale. In order 
to recover the taxable amount, sellers shift the tax by raising commodity prices to 
consumers. Federal statutory excise taxes in the United States are imposed under Subtitle 
D – “Miscellaneous Excise Taxes” and Subtitle E – “Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain 
Other Excise Taxes” of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C § 4001 through 26 U.S.C. § 
5891 describe the excise taxes imposed on commodities in the United States, including 
luxury passenger automobiles, tires, petroleum products, coal, vaccines, recreational 
equipment, indoor tanning services, firearms, air transportation, water transportation, 
policies issued by foreign insurance companies, chemicals, non-deductible contributions 
to certain employer plans, alcohol and cigarettes. In addition, the three main targets of 
global excise taxation are gasoline, alcohol and cigarettes. Excise taxes on the latter 
commodities are considered sin taxes. 
Representing a sub-classification of excise taxes, sin taxes impose additional costs 
on products or services that are not only viewed as vices and affect individual’s health, 
such as alcohol and tobacco, but also those determined to be morally objectionable. This 
form of taxation, levied by the local governments, discourages individuals from 
participating in activities without making their use illegal. Unlike other forms of taxation, 
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sin taxes only affect those who use the aforementioned products. Therefore, sin taxes are 
often accepted by the general public and favored by governments for generating income. 
 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF EXCISE TAXATION: 
The first western philosopher to indirectly discuss economic policies involving sin 
taxes on luxury goods, including tobacco, rum, and sugar, was Adam Smith. In An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith suggests that such 
items are “extremely proper subjects of taxation” due to their widespread use and 
consumption (Smith 1818, 341). Although he does not explicitly advocate taxing morally 
objectionable goods and services, Smith supports tax legislation that deters negative 
externalities, such as alcoholism, that affect unrelated third parties. Furthermore, 
according to Smith, taxes that deter negative behaviors lead to a more productive society. 
With more productive members, a society is better able to reach its full potential by 
generating more economic output and, in turn, become more prosperous (Smith 1818, 
288-289).   
In his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), English political 
economist, David Ricardo, elaborates on Smith’s theories regarding excise taxation. 
Ricardo states that “taxes on luxuries have some advantage over taxes on necessaries” as 
taxes on luxuries reduce profits for industrialists by increasing wage rates (Ricardo 1817, 
167-168). Ricardo also hypothesizes that consumers have “taxation limits” where, once 
the limit is reached, the consumer will decrease or cease purchases of the goods. For the 
consumer, the higher price does not equate to the products’ perceived worth (Ricardo 
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1817, 167-168). Ricardo explains that this limit differs between products and the deciding 
factor depends on the relative satisfaction derived from the product by the consumer.  
Expanding upon Smith’s idea of negative externalities, British economist Arthur 
C. Pigou discusses the benefits of sin taxes (Pigouvian taxes) for alcohol and tobacco 
products on health and public safety. In The Economics of Welfare (1920), Pigou argues 
that industrialists seek their own marginal private interests without regard for social 
interests. First, when social interests diverge from marginal private interests, the 
industrialists have no incentive to internalize the cost affecting third-party members of 
society. Much like Adam Smith, Pigou declares that companies selling alcohol affect 
social interests. In particular, crime associated with alcohol consumption necessitates 
higher costs for policemen and detention facilities. Second, when marginal social costs 
exceed the private benefit of industrialists, the cost-creator over-produces the product. In 
order to manage over-production, Pigou recommends a tax, like sin tax, to equalize the 
marginal private cost and the social cost. Under the imposition of taxation, industrialists 
pay for the externalities they create thereby decreasing the supply and creating 
equilibrium in the market.  
In accordance with Pigouvian Theory, sin taxes impact producers of taxable 
commodities through decreases in long-term commodity supplies due to price changes. 
Assuming that consumers had been willing to pay the original price plus the taxable 
portion, the producers could successfully have charged that amount in the absence of tax. 
With the imposition of sin taxes, however, firms are unable to increase the base prices of 
their commodities without affecting demand and therefore do not receive compensation 
for the increased costs of conducting business due to the tax. As a result, these firms will 
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decrease their supplies. In addition, the exiting of marginal firms from the industry as a 
result of higher taxes also reduces the supply. The decrease in supply coupled with a 
constant demand increases the price of commodity supplies.  
 
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF EXCISE TAXATION: 
The first instance of sin taxation influencing the price of commodity supplies 
occurred in the form of the gabelle, or salt tax, in France. Following the close of the 
Albigensian Crusades by Louis IX in 1229, the Rhône estuary was ceded to the French 
Crown. The marsh terrain, including the Camargue swamp, was an ideal location for salt 
mining. In 1246, Louis established the first French Mediterranean port, Aigues-Mortes, 
which referred to the “dead waters” of the salt evaporation ponds in the area. Louis, with 
ambitions of invading the Middle East, not only recognized the profitability of salt and its 
production but also originated the French salt gabelle tax as means of generating revenue 
for war. Originally established during the mid-fourteenth century, the gabelle was an 
indirect tax applied to agricultural and industrial commodities including wheat, spices, 
and wine. From the fourteenth century onward, however, the gabelle was limited and 
solely referred to the monarchy’s taxation of salt.  
Regarded as the leading source of state revenues, the gabelle exploited the 
inelastic demand for salt in France. Comte Charles de Provence, the brother of Louis IX, 
initiated the first attempt at comprehensive salt administration in 1259. In the following 
century, the administration, labeled the Pays de Petite Gabelle, extended to Aigues-
Mortes, Camargue, and Peccais. The Pays de Grande Gabelle followed in 1341 under the 
rule of Philip VI. Each administration uniformly levied a 1.66 percent sales tax on salt 
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across France. Much like other taxes of the time, however, these rates varied for the 
greater part of France’s history and resulted in large disparities between regions. In 
addition, unlike proceeding sin taxes of today, the gabelle imposed the sel du devoir, a 
salt duty. Every citizen over the age of eight living in the Grande Gabelle was required to 
purchase 15.4 pounds of salt each year at a fixed government rate. Further restrictions 
stated that using the sel du devoir to create salted products was considered faux saunage, 
salt fraud.  
Although the salt tax was not the sole cause of the French Revolution, the gabelle 
not only symbolized unfair distributions of power and wealth but also the represented the 
injustices of the government against the citizens of France. By the late eighteenth 
century, more than three thousand French men, women and children were sentenced to 
prison or death yearly for crimes against the gabelle or the gabelous, the collectors and 
enforcers of the salt tax. Religious figures, nobility, and high-ranking officials were 
exempt from the gabelle, however. Following the ascension of the National Assembly in 
1789, the gabelle was abolished throughout France and all persons imprisoned for laws 
pertaining to the gabelle were freed. After being reinstated by Napoleon Bonaparte in 
1804, the gabelle would remain part of France’s legislation until its final abolishment in 
1946.  
Smith’s early discourse on excise taxation influenced the development of tax 
legislation in the United States. Maintaining legal traditions of France other Western 
European countries, the United States drafted the U.S. Constitution with provisions for 
excise taxes and therefore sin taxes. Prior to the ratification of the United States 
Constitution by the ninth state in 1788, the previous central government under the 
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Articles of Confederation was unable to levy taxes. Under Article I, Section VIII, Clause 
I of the U.S. Constitution, however, the newly formed Congress developed the power “to 
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and exercises, to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties” (U.S. 
Constitution, 1788). The clause continues to state that all “duties, imposts and excises 
shall be uniform throughout the United States.” Responding to the need for government 
revenue following the end of the American Revolutionary War, the United States 
Congress and President George Washington signed the Tariff Act of July 4, 1789. The 
purpose of the Tariff Act, recommended by the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 
Alexander Hamilton, was to decrease the $54 million state and federal debt incurred 
during the American Revolutionary War. In addition to unobtrusive tariffs on foreign 
imports, low excise taxes were imposed on whiskey, rum, tobacco, snuff, and refined 
sugar. 
Following the historical trends of the French Revolution, excise tax protests, 
beginning in 1791, lead to the Whiskey Insurrection in the United States. During the 
presidency of George Washington, the tax on distilled spirits was the first tax imposed by 
the newly formed federal government on domestic products through the Whiskey Act. 
Based on Smith’s theories outlined in the Wealth of Nations, the tax was coined the 
“whiskey tax” due to the high levels of whiskey consumption during the eighteenth 
century. Prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution, the previous central 
government under the Articles of Confederation was unable to levy taxes and therefore 
borrowed $54 million to fund the Revolution. Large amounts of investments from bond-
holders required a source of revenue to offset the debt. Hamilton believed that the 
!!
9 
whiskey excise, amounting to seven cents per gallon of whiskey and ten cents per gallon 
of rum, was a form of luxury tax and the least objectionable tax the government could 
levy (Shughart 1998, 33). In contrast, social reformers believed that the “sin tax” would 
raise public awareness about the harmful effects of alcohol.  
Much like the opinions of the gabelle of France, citizens of the United States 
argued that the tax not only unfairly targeted westerners but also was imposed without 
local representation, which resulted in resistance. Given the popularity of spirits during 
the eighteenth century, famers west of the Appalachians supplemented their incomes by 
distilling their excess grain into whiskey. The whiskey, being less cumbersome than 
grain, was transported and used as a medium of exchange during cash shortages. With the 
imposition of whiskey taxes, western farmers believed that eastern farmers had a 
competitive advantage through tax breaks. Under Hamilton’s plan, the whiskey excise 
was imposed either by paying a flat fee or by the gallon. Large distilleries, primarily 
located in the east, produced whiskey in volume and therefore paid less tax per gallon. In 
addition, given the use of whiskey for exchange, farmers argued that the excise was an 
additional income tax. In opposition to the tax, members of the rebellion, including 
farmers of Western and Southern states, tarred and feathered revenue collectors as well as 
civilians who complied with the tax. Hamilton believed that the United States 
government could not claim to be established until “some signal display manifested its 
power of military coercion” and convinced President George Washington to combat the 
rebellion (Shughart 1998, 34). In 1794, thirteen thousand militiamen confronted the 
rebels, who dispersed before violence action ensued. Although the Whiskey Insurrection 
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did not result in changes to the tax structure, the incident established and demonstrated 
the United States power to levy excise taxes.  
Despite Smith’s argument that the taxation of luxury goods generates sizeable 
government revenues, excise and sin taxes remained unfavorable in the United States 
throughout the 1800s. Focusing his campaign on the abolishment of internal taxation, 
Thomas Jefferson repealed excise taxes on whiskey, rum, snuff, and sugar in 1801. 
Following Jefferson’s election into office, excise taxes in the United States were only 
levied to provide government revenue during wartime periods, with the exception of the 
Great Depression era. Although excise taxes continued to face opposition during these 
periods, American society embraced the patriotic reasoning for the taxation until they 
were repealed following each period of war.  
The effects of wartime excise taxation are present in today’s markets for alcohol 
and tobacco products. In an effort to raise revenue for the Civil War, Congress passed the 
Internal Revenue Act of July 1, 1862, which established the first excise tax on cigars. 
This was also the first legislation in the United States to tax rolled tobacco products. 
Seeking to earn additional revenue for the war, Congress increased these excise taxes and 
established the first tax on cigarettes with the Internal Revenue Act of June 30,1864 
(Werner 1922, 358). Most excise taxes were repealed after the end of the Civil War in 
1867 and 1870, with the exception of taxes on alcohol and tobacco products. In 1951, the 
federal cigarette excise tax increased from seven cents to eight cents per pack in order to 
finance the Korean War. The federal cigarette tax doubled in 1983 to sixteen cents per 
pack.  In 1985, the federal government levied a tax of twenty-four cents per pound on 
snuff, eight centers per pound on chewing tobacco, and forty-five centers per pound on 
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pipe tobacco (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1994). Changes in federal and 
state taxes on tobacco products continue to fund government revenues today.  
In addition to alcohol and tobacco products, the Federal Margarine Act of 1886, 
imposed a sin tax on oleomargarine with the intent of creating a safer world for 
consumers and to protect dairy producers. Oleomargarine, invented by French chemist, 
Hippolyte Mège-Mouriès, was introduced to United States markets in 1874 by the U.S. 
Dairy Company. Over a seven-year period, the U.S. Dairy Company and its subsidiary, 
the Commercial Manufacturing Company, opened fifteen factories and controlled ten 
percent of the market for margarine oil and margarine butter products. By 1882, the U.S. 
Dairy Company produced fifty thousand pounds of margarine daily and twenty million 
pounds annually. As prices decreased, consumers purchased more margarine compared to 
other dairy butter products. As a result of the change in consumer preferences, the vice 
president of the New York State Dairy Association, Professor L.B. Arnold, determined 
that “the availability of margarine caused producers of creamery butters to increase their 
quality in order to maintain their comparative advantage” (Young, 2002). In turn, small 
family-operated producers of lower-grade butters, unable to compete with larger and 
more efficient industrial producers, lost their market share and sought sales in foreign 
markets. In order to stimulate international sales, smaller producers marketed margarine 
as American butter. In 1880, margarine exports, in the form of oil, increased to sixteen 
million pounds annually. In response to increased sales, the dairy lobby waged a 
campaign regarding health concerns and margarine consumption. Margarine was 
described as containing “many kinds of living organisms, with masses of dead mould 
[sic], bits of cellulose, various colored particles, shreds of hair, bristles, etc., while other 
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samples teemed with life; doubtful portions of worms were also noticed…corpuscles 
from cockroach, small bits of claws, corpuscles of sheep, the egg of a tape-worm…a dead 
hydraviridis” (Young, 2002).  Fearing international bans on American butter products 
due to fraud and health concerns, the Dairy Association lobbied heavily for legislative 
controls on domestic margarine producers. In 1886, the Federal Margarine Act imposed a 
ten-cent tax on margarine resembling the color of butter, mandated annual license fees, 
and required margarine producers to label their products. The public viewed the 
additional tax as a deterrent to protect the health of consumers, however, the true intent 
was to ensure the profitability of dairy butter producers in the United States.  
 
CIGARETTE TAXATION AND REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2015): 
According to the Tobacco Institute, as of January 1, 2015, all fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, and 600 towns, cities, and counties levy taxes on cigarettes. Today, 
local jurisdictions generate approximately $430 million in annual revenue from cigarette 
tax rates or additional fees (Tobacco Free Kids, 2015). In 1921, Iowa became the first 
state to tax cigarettes; in 1969, North Carolina was the last state to enact a cigarette 
excise tax. Much like federal excises, the imposition of and the increases in state tobacco 
taxes, with a few exceptions, are used to generate revenue. The level of the tax imposed, 
however, directly correlates to the state’s dependency on tobacco production. For 
example, in 1992, “the average cigarette tax in non-tobacco producing states was 
nineteen cents higher than in large tobacco-producing states” (Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 1994). Since 1988, states have used additional ballot initiatives to 
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increase tobacco taxes not only for revenue but also for anti-smoking campaigns. In 
November 1988, California ratified Proposition 99, which increased the state cigarette 
excise tax from ten cents to thirty-five cents per pack. Similarly, in November 1992, 
Massachusetts’ voters passed a state tax increase by twenty-five cents per pack.  
Furthermore, problems with enforcement of tax laws occurred due these 
differences among state and local cigarette excise tax rates. During the late 1960s, as the 
difference between state and local tax rates increased,  “organized smuggling and illegal 
diversion of cigarettes from the legal distribution system also increased” (Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1977). According to the 1977 report by the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, tax evasion strategies included 
“casual smuggling, or buying cigarettes in neighboring states with lower taxes; purchase 
of cigarettes through tax-free outlets such as military stores and American-Indian 
reservations, commercial smuggling for resale, and illegal diversion of cigarettes within 
the traditional distribution system by forging tax stamps and underreporting” (Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1977). In response to the increasing levels 
of tax evasion, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Contraband Act, which prohibited 
the “transportation, receipt, shipment, possession, distribution, or purchase of more than 
sixty thousand cigarettes not bearing the indicia of the state in which the cigarettes were 
found” (Lewit, 1982). Although the Federal Cigarette Contraband Act significantly 
reduced the organized interstate smuggling of cigarettes, the casual smuggling and 
purchase of cigarettes from neighboring states continues to affect states with high 
cigarette taxes.  
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The increasing discrepancy between cigarette pack prices and federal and state 
excise taxes is apparent between 1955 and 1993 in the United States. During these years, 
the average state excise tax on cigarettes increased more than federal taxes since 1955. In 
1955, the total average price per pack of cigarettes was approximately twenty-three cents. 
The selling price included eleven cents for taxes, which equates to 48% of the total price. 
On November 1, 1993, the average price of a pack of cigarettes was $1.79, with 
approximately 30% due to taxes (fifty-three cents).  
The current tax rates for each stated as of January 1, 2015 are listed on Table 1 
entitled State Tax Rates on Cigarettes on page 16. Currently, the median excise tax 
amount per state in the United States is $1.36. The state of New York imposes the highest 
excise tax rate on cigarettes with an additional $4.35 due per pack. In contrast, Missouri 
levies the lowest tax at a rate of seventeen cents per pack. The chart provides further 
evidence of the correlation between the level of taxes imposed and the dependency of the 
state on tobacco production. Tobacco producing states, such as North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Georgia, and Virginia, levy lower cigarette excise taxes than those that depend 
on tobacco imports, for example Hawaii, Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts. 
 Today, lawmakers continue to use sin taxes on alcohol, gambling, and tobacco 
products to recover state budget deficits. In the fiscal year 2014, as described in Figure 1, 
states collected 
approximately 
$32.5 billion in 
sin taxes on 




State Budget Officers, state legislatures have shown that they are most apt to increase 
excise taxes on tobacco products. From fiscal years 2000 to 2015, states enacted a total of 
“111 tax increases on tobacco products and another 23 on alcohol” (Maciag, 2015). 
Nationally, however, sin taxes accounted for 3.76 percent of total state tax revenues in 
2014. The extent to which individual states rely on sin taxes varies based on the size of 






















FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS -- January 2015
STATE EXCISE TAX RATES ON CIGARETTES
(January 1, 2015)
TAX RATE TAX RATE
STATE (¢ per pack) RANK STATE (¢ per pack) RANK
Alabama (a)         42.5 47 Nebraska  64 38
Alaska 200 12 Nevada              80 35
Arizona             200 12 New Hampshire 178 18
Arkansas 115 30 New Jersey 270 9
California          87 33 New Mexico          166 21
Colorado 84 34 New York (a) 435 1
Connecticut         340 4 North Carolina 45 45
Delaware 160 22 North Dakota        44 46
Florida (b)        133.9 27 Ohio                125 29
Georgia             37 48 Oklahoma            103 31
Hawaii 320 5 Oregon (e) 131 28
Idaho               57 42 Pennsylvania 160 22
Illinois (a)        198 17 Rhode Island        350 3
Indiana             99.5 32 South Carolina      57 42
Iowa                136 26 South Dakota        153 24
Kansas 79 36 Tennessee (a)  62 39
Kentucky (c)        60 40 Texas               141 25
Louisiana 36 49 Utah                170 19
Maine         200 12 Vermont             275 8
Maryland            200 12 Virginia (a) 30 50
Massachusetts       351 2 Washington       302.5 6
Michigan            200 12 West Virginia       55 44
Minnesota (d)  290 7 Wisconsin           252 10
Mississippi          68 37 Wyoming             60 40
Missouri (a)        17 51
Montana             170 19 Dist. of Columbia (f)  250 11
U. S. Median 136.0
Source: Compiled by FTA from state sources.
         
(a) Counties and cities may impose an additional tax on a pack of cigarettes:  in Alabama, 1¢ to 25¢; Illinois, 10¢ to $4.18;  
Missouri, 4¢ to 7¢; New York City, $1.50; Tennessee, 1¢; and Virginia, 2¢ to 15¢.
(b) Florida's rate includes a surcharge of $1 per pack.
(c) Dealers pay an additional enforcement and administrative fee of 0.1¢ per pack in Kentucky and 0.05¢ in Tennessee. 
(d) In addition, Minnesota imposes an in lieu cigarette sales tax determined annually by the Department. 
     The current rate is 52.6¢ through December 31, 2015.
(e) Tax rate in Oregon is scheduled to increase to $1.32 per pack January 1, 2016
(f) In addition, District of Columbia imposes an in lieu cigarette sales tax calculated every March 31. The curent rate is 40¢.
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INDIVIDUAL STATE ANALYSIS OF CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXATION: 
Lucy Dadayan, a policy analyst at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, states 
that a select group of states, including Nevada, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, rely 
more heavily on sin taxes than other states. Known for its sizable collection of gambling 
revenue, Nevada reported casino tax collection exceeding $900 million, approximately 
thirteen percent of total tax revenues in 2014. The state’s heavy reliance on sin taxes 
explains its lack of income tax (Maciag, 2015). Although more casinos continue to open 
in different parts of the country, gambling does not represent a fast-growing revenue 
source. Dadayan explains that, “gambling collections grow at a much slower pace than 
expenditures and other sources of revenue” (Maciag, 2015). Following the recession, 
Nevada casinos experienced steep declines until gaming revenues increased for four 
consecutive fiscal years beginning in 2011. Unlike other states where gambling-related 
revenues shift across state borders, Nevada, according to the Nevada Control Board, does 
not experience fluctuations in revenue due to the competition for international tourism in 
Las Vegas.  
Rhode Island, the smallest state geographically in the United States, is the most 
dependent on sin taxes on gambling and tobacco products for tax revenue. In contrast to 
Nevada, Rhode Island faces competition from bordering states, including Connecticut 
and Massachusetts, for gambling revenues. Two casinos, including Twin River Casino, 
generate the majority of state gambling revenue, which account for a tenth of total state 
tax collections. Twin River also routes sixty-one percent of video lottery terminal 
revenues to state coffers, a higher share than most other revenue sharing agreements, 
which also contributes to the large amounts of tax revenue. The Rhode Island Public 
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Expenditure Council anticipates that gambling revenues will decrease between thirty-six 
and forty-one percent between 2015 and 2020. The Expenditure Council fears that this 
heavy reliance on taxes of gambling revenue will worsen the structural deficit of Rhode 
Island. In order to offset the anticipated loss, Rhode Island imposes one of the highest 
taxes on tobacco sales in any state (Maciag, 2015). In fiscal year 2014, the state collected 
approximately five percent of its total tax revenue from excise taxes on tobacco products.  
Much like Rhode Island, New Hampshire relies heavily on the taxation of tobacco 
products to generate state income. During fiscal year 2014, New Hampshire collected 
$225,357,000 in 
sin tax revenue, 
which accounts 
for 9.9% of the 
state’s total tax 
revenue (Maciag, 2015). New Hampshire’s lack of sales tax not only creates a heavy 
reliance on tobacco taxation but also generates cross-border cigarette sales due to lower 











PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR CIGARETTES: 
A regression model, calculated by John Lovell Jarvis at Wesleyan University 
(Jarvis 2010, 45), can be used to describe the effects of taxation and regulation on the 
demand for cigarettes. The primary assumption for the model is that the final price per 
pack of cigarettes is the deciding factor in purchases for consumers. As previously 
described, the sin tax on cigarette sales composes a large percentage of the overall price 
per pack of cigarettes. Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) reaffirm this fact by stating “the 
full amount of a cigarette excise tax is passed on to consumers as a price increase, and 
that any increase in the excise tax rate of cigarettes in a given state direct increase price 
per pack in that state” (Evan,1999). In order for prices to influence consumption 
behaviors of cigarettes, the price elasticity for a pack of cigarettes must be elastic. The 
assumption that cigarette supply is perfectly elastic is consistent with the findings of 
Barzel (1976), Harris (1987), Sumner (1981) and Keeler (1996).  
Despite price increase due to regulation and taxation, economists argue that other 
factors discourage cigarette consumption. In addition to price increases, Licari and Meier 
(2000) suggest that “signaling effects” also deter behavior. According to Licari and 
Meier, a signaling effect occurs when governments communicate negative characteristics 
of consuming a good through tax increase. For example, when government-sponsored 
anti-smoking campaigns publicize the negative health consequences and externalities 
associated with cigarettes to consumers, economists believe the information dissuades 
behavior.  
Given the separate explanations for changes in cigarette consumption, Jarvis 
states that both explanatory variables need to be included in the regression. Jarvis 
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believes that “one problem with including price as an independent variable in the demand 
equation for cigarettes is that price is expected to be a function of cigarette demand and 
[therefore] there will be endogeneity in the equation” (Jarvis 2010, 45). The endogeneity 
will cause bias in the estimates produced by the regression. Therefore, Jarvis develops a 
model where the effects of the price increase on the per capita consumption of cigarettes 
is determined without directly including price as an explanatory variable. In order to 
resolve the endogeneity, a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model is used.  
The purpose of the developing the model is to determine the elasticity of demand 
for cigarettes. In an analysis of eighty-six publications focused on cigarette consumption 
and demand, Gallet and List (2003) determine that the mean price elasticity of cigarette 
demand is -0.48. Similar studies, conducted by Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999), calculate 
the elasticity to be in the range of -0.3 to -.05. In addition, Chaloupka and Warner (2000) 
report that the price elasticity of cigarette demand is approximately -.04.  
Using the findings of Baltagi and Levin (1986); and Baltagi, Griffin, and Xiong 
(2000), the regression model is expressed by the following equation: 
Qit = ß0 + ß1Pit + ß2Yit + ß3Bit + ß4Lit + ß5Ait + ß6Qi,t-1 + ß7Qi,t-1 + 
ß8Wit + ß8BLit + at + ai + eit  
According to Baltagi and Levin (1986), the variables represent the following information: 
The dependent variable, Qit, represents the state per capita cigarette 
 consumption for state (i) and period (t). The independent variables are “the  
real average price per pack of cigarettes in state (i) in time (t), Pit, real  
disposable per capita income, Yit, an index which measures the incentive  
for residents to purchase cigarettes in a neighboring state, Bit, an index  
representing the level of anti-smoking legislation, Lit, the average age of  
residents over the age of sixteen, Ait, per capita packs of cigarettes sold  
lagged by one year, Qi,t-1, per capita packs of cigarettes sold in the  
following year, Qi,t+1, the percentage of White residents in the population,  
Wit, and the percentage of Black residents in the population, BLit. The  
!!
21 
variable ai represents any time-invariant state factors that might affect 
  cigarette consumption, at, denotes time-varying factors on a national level  
that might affect cigarette consumption, and eit represents the error-term in  
a given state and year. (Jarvis 2010, 54) 
 
The aforementioned variables of the model can be described further to illustrate 
their effects on cigarette consumption. Denoted by ai, individual time-invariant state 
factors refer to constant, inherent qualities of a state, such as geography, that affect 
cigarette consumption trends. In contrast, time-varying national factors, denoted by at, are 
factors that change cigarette consumption levels in the United States. For example, the 
release of Surgeon General’s Warnings and additional information regarding the health 
concerns and consequences of cigarette consumption on purchase and consumption rates.  
The legislation variable incorporated in the model (Lit) is a measure of the “the 
level of restrictive smoking legislation in state (i) during time (t)” (Jarvis 2010, 45). In 
response to the Surgeon General’s Warnings in 1972 and 1986, which demonstrated a 
connection between smoking and lung cancer, many laws were enacted to restrict 
smoking in private and public domains, including the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act of 
1975. Anti-smoking legislation not only alerts consumers to health effects and negative 
externalities of smoking but also increases the inconvenience of smoking through 
restrictions. In regards to the model, these restrictions relate to smoking locations. The 
government can restrict smoking locations in three ways: “the location must have 
designated smoking areas, the building must have separate ventilated areas, or smoking is 
banned completely” (Jarvis 2010, 48). Designating smoking and non-smoking areas is the 
least restrictive policy, quantified with a restrictive level of one, while banning smoking 
is the most restrictive form of legislation, denoted with a value of 3 in the formula. A 
value of zero denotes no restrictive legislation in a given location. 
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States use legislation to influence smoking behavior in public settings. The 
legislation variable also describes four locations where smoking restrictions are enacted 
in most states to influence behavior: public transportation, private workplaces, restaurants 
and bars. Similar to the legislation vector used by Tauras and Liang (2003), which 
measured the statistical significance of clean air laws on smoking behavior, the 
legislation variable equally weights the sum of restrictive measures enacted in each of the 
aforementioned locations in state (i) for the period (t). Therefore, Jarvis defines the 
legislation variables as: 
Lit= PTit + PWit + Rit + BARit 
“where PTit represents smoking legislation concerning public transportation in state (i) 
and time (t), PWit denotes legislation in the private workplace, Rit, represents smoking 
legislation in restaurants, and BARit denotes legislation targeted in bars” (Jarvis 2010, 
49). Because the individual variables can be quantified with the numbers zero through 
three, the maximum value of legislation index, Lit, equals twelve.  
  Although their results were inconclusive, Baltagi and Levin (1986) and Stehr 
(2005) hypothesize that the bootlegging effect, due to lower selling prices and differing 
tax rates in nearby states, is also statistically significant in the model results. The 
economists believe that three factors influence a consumer’s decision to purchase 
cigarettes across state borders. The first factor is the price differential between packs of 
cigarettes in different states. The second factor relates to the length of the border between 
neighboring states. It is assumed that states in contact with more bordering states have 
increased opportunities for cross-state purchases. The final factor influencing out of state 
purchases is the total area of the consumers’ home state. The smaller the total area of the 
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state, the less opportunities the consumer has to purchase cigarettes and will, therefore, 
make purchases elsewhere if the perceived benefit is higher. In order to quantify these 
factors, however, the cross-border cigarette purchase index must become more “positive 
as the incentive for purchasing cigarettes in a bordering state increases, and likewise 
become more negative when there is increased incentive for consumers in neighboring 
states to purchase cigarettes in their own state” (Jarvis 2010, 50). Thus, the variable 
should increase in absolute magnitude as the price differential and border lengths 
increase. Following these constructions, Jarvis represents the bootlegging variable as 
follows: 
  
where (Tit-Tnt) denotes the price differential between cigarette excise tax rates in state (i) 
and its neighboring state (n) for a period of time (t). In addition, “Xin represents the 
border length between state (i) and its neighboring state (n) in miles [while] AREAi 
denotes the area of state (i) in square miles” (Jarvis 2010, 51).  
The combination of these equations in the cigarette consumption model offers 
several advantages for concluding on the demand for cigarettes as well as for determining 
the price elasticity of demand. Through the variable Yit, which denotes the real per capita 
disposable income of consumers, the model is able to determine whether cigarettes are 
inferior or normal goods. For normal goods, higher consumer incomes indicate that an 
individual will purchase a greater number of products in a given year. The inverse of this 
statement reflects the purchasing patterns for inferior goods. A negative estimated 
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coefficient for Yit signifies that cigarettes are inferior goods while a positive coefficient 
classifies cigarettes as normal goods. According to Jarvis, a negative coefficient also 
signifies that government revenues collected through increased cigarette taxes are borne 
disproportionately by lower income consumers who are least able to pay them.  
Furthermore, the cigarette consumption model indicates the effectiveness of anti-
smoking legislation on consumer smoking behavior by analyzing the coefficient of the 
variable Lit, the legislation index. A negative coefficient indicates that legislative 
measures are effective in preventing smoking and may be “more equitable than taxation 
if the intentions of state governments are to reduce cigarette consumption in their state” 
(Jarvis 2010, 54). Conversely, if the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant or 
positive, one can conclude that legislative measures are not effective in reducing cigarette 
consumption or deterring behavior.  
Penultimately, the model also tests the cigarette addiction theories proposed by 
Becker and Murphy (1988) and Gruber and Köszegi (2002). The addiction theories assert 
that consumers are “not only influenced by past consumption of addictive goods but also 
adjust their current consumption of these goods based on their future consumption and 
preferences for addictive substances” (Jarvis 2010, 55). Under this assertion, the current 
demand for cigarettes is a function of both past and future demand for cigarettes. The 
model incorporates this concept through the variables Qi,t-1 and Q1,t+1. The works of 
Baltagi and Griffin (2001) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) support the 
inclusion of past and present per capita sales for packs of cigarettes.  
The final benefit of the cigarette consumption model is its ability to quantify the 
effects of the bootlegging variable (Bit) on the demand for cigarettes. A statistically 
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significant coefficient of the bootlegging variable suggests that the difference between 
cigarette excise tax rates of neighboring states influences the demand for cigarettes. 
Therefore, states attempting to earn revenue through cigarette excise tax changes should 
be aware of changes in other jurisdictions.  
Despite the perceived advantages of the cigarette consumption model, the lack of 
available data for other variables regarding cigarette consumptions hinders the accuracy 
of the model’s results. The first variable that is not incorporated in the model is the level 
of education attained by consumers of smoking age in each state. Due to more awareness 
in regards to the health consequences of smoking, it is believed that the more education 
one attains, the less likely he or she consumes cigarettes. The time frame of this variable, 
for which yearly data was not available from the United States Census Bureau prior to 
1993, does not align with the research of the other model variables. In order to determine 
the statistical significance of education on the effects of cigarette consumption, however, 
Jarvis uses information from 1998 to 2008 in a second set of regressions where the 
dependent variable is smoking prevalence.  
In addition, the percentage of individuals in each state that do not identify 
themselves as Black or White, such as Asian and Native American, are not included in 
the regression due to lack of information. Although these other races are “intrinsically 
accounted for in the model as being neither white nor black,” the races are not 
incorporated as separate variables in the regressions due to unavailable data between 
1970 and 2008.  
According to Jarvis, because the model analyzes data that spans over thirty-eight 
years, heteroskedasticity may exist. Although it does not generate biased or inconsistent 
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results, heteroskedasticity underestimates the variance and standard errors of the 
coefficients in the model (Woolridge 2009, 264-265). The variance of the variables 
differs in each time period and, therefore, the regressions may “give too much 
significance to some variables and falsely conclude that they are statistically significant 
determinants of cigarette demand (Jarvis 2010, 67). In his model, Jarvis attempts to 
control the possibility of heteroskedasticity by using Huber-White standard errors, which 
increases the certainty that estimated coefficients are correct values.  
Information from the Center for Disease and Control Prevention (CDC), the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the United States Census are used to calculate the variable 
Qit and Yit. In its program State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE), 
the CDC collects annual data for state per capita packs of cigarettes sold as early as the 
1970s. The CDC’s STATE program also provides information regarding annual state 
cigarette excise tax rates and annual state average retail price per pack of cigarettes for 
use in the model. Furthermore, to convert the nominal dollar values into real dollar values 
for the per capita real disposable income variable (Yit), Jarvis uses the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. With 2007 as a base year, the study also 
converts average price per pack of cigarettes and state excise tax rates into real dollar 
values (Jarvis 2010, 70).  
The Center for Disease and Control Prevention also provides information for the 
variables Bit and Wit, which relate to the racial differences in cigarette consumption 
trends in the United States. The CDC’s WONDER system, which compiles population 
data from the United States Census Bureau, provides state population data, populations 
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by race and age groupings from all fifty states between 1970 and 2008 which are used in 
the study.  
Furthermore, The CDC STATE system provides data for legislation restricting the 
consumption of tobacco products in public and private locations. Using similar categories 
for anti-smoking legislation, such as none, designated areas, separate ventilated areas and 
incorporate data from the State Cancer Legislative Database Program. 
In order to assess the bootlegging variable, Bit, Jarvis uses information on state 
border lengths and state areas. In a dataset created by Thomas Holmes, an economics 
professor at the University of Minnesota, border lengths for each state, excluding Alaska 
and Hawaii, are denoted in miles. The model incorporates information regarding state 
areas in square miles from the United States Census of Population and Housing in 2000.  
Table 2 – Variable Summary on page 28, compiled by Jarvis, summarizes the data 
used in the cigarette consumption model and provides the means and standard deviations 





Table 2 – Variable Summary 
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The results of the regression are listed in Table 3 – Regression Results on page 30. 
Both column (i) and column (ii) give estimates for Pit, Qi,t-1, and Qi,t+1, which are treated 
as endogenous variables. Furthermore, column (i) “consists of the current tax rate, Tit, the 
tax rate in the lagged period, Ti,t-1, the tax rate one year in the future, Ti,t+1, a two-year lag 
of the price variable, Pi, t-2, plus the other explanatory variables of the model” (Jarvis 
2010, 73). In addition to these variables, column (ii) includes a three-year lag for the 
price variable, Pi,t-3. 
The R-square value of 0.9739 signifies that the model adequately describes 
97.39% of the variation in the demand for cigarettes. Most importantly, the model 
calculates a statistically significant coefficient of -0.1748 for the price variable, Pit. 
Because the absolute magnitude of price elasticity is less than one, the coefficient 
indicates that cigarettes are price inelastic. Furthermore, the value implies that “a 10% 
increase in the price of cigarettes will result in a decrease of 1.748% in the number of 
cigarettes consumed per capita (Jarvis 2010, 73). This value is less negative and smaller 
in absolute value than in the aforementioned studies. The price elasticity of cigarettes 
differs from the studies of Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999) due to the availability of more 
timely and relevant information and the inclusion of the bootlegging variable, a tax-
avoidant behavior. As previously mentioned, Goel and Nelson (2006), Baltagi and Goel 
(1987), and Huang, Yang and Hwang (2004) develop similar conclusions regarding the 
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes. The economists further their findings by 
suggesting the price elasticity decreases over time. The results of Jarvis’ study act in 
accordance with this idea. Jarvis believes that his findings reflect the possibility “that 
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smoking in recent years, leaving only those individuals who are more addicted to 
smoking and less sensitive to price changes per pack “ (Jarvis 2010, 76).The remaining 
smoker population is less likely to adjust their smoking behavior due to price increases or 
more information regarding the health consequences of smoking. Instead, consumers are 
participating in tax-avoidant behavior to feed their addiction. Despite the fact that that the 
price elasticity of demand in Jarvis’ study is highly inelastic, it is important to note that 
cigarettes are not completely inelastic. Although it is to lesser degree than the studies of 
the 1980s, there are still consumers in Jarvis’ study who remain sensitive to price changes 
of cigarettes. 
 Based on the results of this study, Jarvis determines that cigarette price changes 
have a significantly lesser effect on cigarette demand than suggested in previous studies. 
The price does not influence smoking behavior but instead changes consumer purchasing 
habits through tax evasion channels. The model also indicates that price is the only 
statistically significant variable that governments can control to influence cigarette 
demand. First, this implies that governments seeking to increase revenues can rely more 
heavily on cigarette excise taxation. Second, if governments use sin taxes to deter 
behavior, excise taxes on cigarettes must be significantly higher than those outlined in 








PRICE ELASTICITY OF CIGARETTES FORMULATED BY TOBACCO 
COMPANIES:  
Since the rise of the American Tobacco Company and the increasing cost 
advantages achieved from the mass production of hand rolled cigarettes by James Duke, 
tobacco companies have employed pricing as one of their most important marketing 
strategies. With the invention of the Bonsack cigarette machine, invented in 1880, Duke 
managed to cut prices for his brand of cigarettes to less than half the cost of his hand-
rolled competitors. Duke used the additional savings to invest in an aggressive 
advertising and promotion campaign, which would be considered illegal under the 
emerging U.S. antitrust laws, and forced his competitors to join his business. The 
consolidation of the cigarette industry in the United States lead to the creation of the 
American Tobacco Company which controlled more than 90% of the market. Due to the 
aggressive marketing campaigns employed by Duke, per capita cigarette consumption in 
the United States “rose from less than one half cigarette per year in 1870 to 35 cigarettes 
per year in 1890” (Chaloupka 2002, 1).  
The significant profits resulting from the monopoly in the cigarette market 
motivated the American Tobacco Company to expand into markets for other tobacco 
products. The company used a “fighting brands” strategy to price cigarettes and other 
tobacco products lower than manufacturing costs thereby driving competitors in the 
market (Kluger, 1996). Despite the financial success of the American Tobacco Company, 
anti-competitive practices under the Sherman Antitrust Act disbanded the monopoly in 
1911. The separation created four entities: American Tobacco Company (ATC), RJ 
Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR), Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company (L&M), and P 
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Lorillard Company. In the following decades, the companies primarily competed through 
new product development and advertising, including advertisements targeting women and 
other target markets.  
In his study Tax, Price, and Cigarette Smoking: Evidence from the Tobacco 
Documents and Implications for Tobacco Company Marketing Strategies, F.J. Chaloupka 
analyzes the pricing and price-related marketing strategies of tobacco companies to 
understand the impact of cigarette prices on smoking among youth, young adults, and 
adults. Using tobacco industry documents procured from the Roswell Park Cancer 
Institute, Chaloupka examines pricing strategies of the four largest tobacco companies, 
which included discount brands and Marlboro Friday.  
As described above, for much of its history, the cigarette industry employed price 
leadership of dominant firms to initiate price increases and decreases of competitors in 
the market. A 1976 report from the business planning and analysis division of Philip 
Morris regarding pricing policy reveals “the general price level is determined by a small 
number of firms (price leaders); that no economic advantage can be obtained by any one 
firm pricing below the general price level; and that major disadvantages accrue to a firm 
which attempts a price above the general level. In short, the general price level results 
from some sparring among the potential price leaders, after which the rest of industry 
accepts the resulting price structure” (Morris, 1976). Furthermore, the report recognizes 
the uneasy relationship among firms in the industry. Although prices are well below the 
profit maximization level, attempting a sharp increase in prices would not produce 
equilibrium at the higher price but “would instead destroy the resiliency of the system” 
(Morris, 1976).  According to Chaloupka, this reflects the awareness of growing price 
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sensitivity among young smokers, the market responsible for sustaining the long run 
profitability of the industry. Chaloupka states that increases in prices to generate short-
run profits ultimately reduces the long-term number of youth smokers in the United 
States and therefore profits in the long-run. In addition, the report also reveals several 
other strategies including: “a straight pass through of the higher costs resulting from 
inflation; a pricing policy that would maintain the relatively high profit margins that had 
been earned historically; one which would provide earnings growth; one that would 
sustain the rate of return on assets; and a full inflation price relief strategy” (Morris, 
1976).  
 During the late 1970s and 1980s, price increases per pack of cigarettes reflected 
the full inflation price relief strategy. As of December of 1975, premium brand 
manufacturers’ list cigarette prices were $12.75 per thousand cigarettes for all major 
manufacturers. By September of 1981, prices rose to $20.20 per thousand to maintain 
profits with rising inflation rates (Tobacco Reporter, 2000). At the end of period, the 
industry diverged from this strategy when Myron Johnston of Philip Morris anticipated 
federal excise tax increases in the early 1980s. Prices were no longer adjusted to reflect 
changing inflation rates but instead to cover the expected federal cigarette tax increase. 
Between February of 1982 and January of 1983, prices increased from $20.20 to $26.90 
per thousand, approximately $2.70 more than the imposed excise taxes. In order to 
maintain their young smoker consumer base, Johnston passed “on the increases in one 
fell swoop and [made] clear to smokers that the government [was] solely responsible for 
the price increases and [advertised] to that effect” (Johnston, 1987). Furthermore, 
Johnston suggested that consumers purchase more packs of cigarettes at lower prices. 
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According to Johnston, when consumes exhaust their supply and purchase more, they 
will be less likely to remember what they last paid and will be less likely to suffer 
“sticker shock.” As a result, Johnston suggests that price increases are not an incentive to 
stop smoking or reduce consumption (Johnston, 1987).  
Due to the economic downturn of the early 1980s, coupled with the increase in 
cigarette prices by inflation and excise taxes of 1983, smokers changed their preference 
towards generic, discount brand cigarettes thereby increasing the market share. A 1983 
report by RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) emphasizes the company’s concerns 
with the price-sensitive environment. The company feared that “price wars” would result 
from the inclusion of generic brands in the market. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company states 
that “there would be heavy competitive activity and differing margins associated with a 
new, multi-tier structure” (Hall, 1983). In addition, the company’s 1984 Strategic 
Research Report describes pricing as the main issue in the cigarette industry. RJ 
Reynolds Tobacco Company believed that younger adult smokers would need more than 
an inexpensive product to adapt a new brand. The report also states that value brands 
“would need a conspicuous second ‘hook’ to reduce possible conflict between younger 
adults’ value wants and imagery wants” (Hall, 1983). The most saleable “hooks” were 
based on product quality. As a result, RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company released “Project 
VB Assessor,” one of its first efforts in entering the discount market (RJ Reynolds, 
1983). By early 1993, discount brands captured nearly 40% of the total cigarette market 
at a selling price of approximately $48.98 per thousand. By comparison, regular sized 
premium brands sold for $71.10 per thousand (Tobacco Reporter, 2000).  
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Philip Morris also used price discounts and advertising in the form of Marlboro 
Friday to impact the number of smokers in the United States. As discount brands 
captured larger shares of the market, the position of Marlboro brand decreased in the 
United States. By 1994, the company projected that Marlboro’s share of sales would 
decrease from 22% to 18%. In an effort to prevent the market share decrease, Philip 
Morris “announced a major shift in business strategy designed to increase market share 
and grow long-term profitability in a highly price sensitive market” (Philip Morris 
Companies Inc., 1993). Through a series of promotional efforts beginning on April 2, 
1993, the price per pack of Marlboro brand cigarettes decreased by forty cents. 
Consequently, due to the price leadership and dominant position of Marlboro in the 
market, the price of premium brands also reduced. The reduction in prices stimulated a 
sharp increase in youth smokers (Grossman, 1997). By the end of 1994, Marlboro’s 
market share rose to 30% and the strategy increased the overall market share of the Philip 
Morris Company to 46.9%. 
The influence of tobacco company price adjustments and marketing strategies not 
only disaffirm Jarvis’ findings regarding the overall price elasticity of cigarettes but also 
suggest differing price elasticity between youth and young adult smokers. In its first 
quarter interim report to stockholders in 1969, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company 
(L&M) describes the impact of state cigarette tax increases on cigarette sales (Ligget & 
Myers Inc., 1969). Noting the nine cent tax on cigarettes during this time, the report 
states: “There is strong evidence to indicate that the consumer demand for cigarettes is 
elastic, as it is for most other products, and that the state cigarette excise taxes do affect 
sales wherever they are imposed. According to the US Department of Agriculture, in 28 
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states where cigarette prices have increased 12% in the last two years, sales have declined 
by 6%; whereas in 21 other states where the price has increased 1%, sales have increased 
almost 1%” (Ligget & Myers Inc., 1969). The findings documented in the 1969 
shareholders report mirror the short-run estimates of price elasticity derived from 
econometric studies of cigarette demand. Similarly, in “Economic Forecast: 1975-1980” 
Myron Johnston, financial analyst for Philip Morris Company, reveals that “the price 
elasticity of cigarettes [is] -0.43. This shows that a 10% increase in the retail price of 
cigarettes leads to a 4.3% decrease in unit sales” (Johnston, 1975). The report also notes, 
in a study conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture, an estimated price 
elasticity of -0.42. Additional reports, written by Philip Morris management associates 
and KPMG Policy Economics Groups, estimate the elasticity of cigarettes between -0.50 
and -0.60.  
Economic theory suggests several factors that describe young adult smokers 
sensitivity to price increases in comparison to adult smokers. These factors include: “the 
fact that young smokers who have been smoking for a shorter time are likely to be less 
addicted than older smokers and, as a result, will more quickly adjust to price changes; 
that youth have lower incomes, making them relatively more responsive to changes in 
prices; that peer effects are more important among youth, multiplying the effects of a 
price induced change in youth smoking; and that youth are more present-oriented and 
therefore, more responsive to changes in immediate smoking costs” (F.J. Chaloupka 
2002, 2). In a 1981 memorandum, Johnston states “price elasticities are different for 
various demographic or socioeconomic groups” (Johnston, 1981). During the 1980s, 
Johnston contributes the declining growth rate of Marlboro Red to the price elasticity of 
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young adult smokers. Marlboro smokers, representing a younger age demographic, earn 
lower incomes and therefore are more responsive to price changes than older segments of 
the population who consume premium brands. Other reports and studies discuss the 
influence of cross-elasticities and substitution effects. In regard to the substitution effect, 
Johnston states that the price of gasoline is a contributing factor to decreasing cigarette 
sales. The sharpest declines in smoking prevalence among teenage males occurred in 
1970 and 1980 when gasoline prices increased exponentially. Johnston also asserts the 
following: 
 
With regard to the substitution effects, or cross-elasticities, I think the most 
important substitution effect is with gasoline. When it comes to a choice between 
smoking cigarettes or cruising around in his car, the average teenage male would 
probably choose the latter” (Johnston, 1981).  
 
 
Given Johnston’s hypothesis, young smokers forgo cigarettes to purchase gasoline. This 
relates the price of cigarettes to the price of other services and income.  
 The variance between the price elasticity of cigarettes in Chaloupka’s analysis in 
comparison to Jarvis’ is due to the timing of relevant information and the number of 
external variables included in each calculation. Unlike Jarvis’ study, which analyzes 
smoking data through 2010, Chaloupka’s report analyzes marketing strategies and pricing 
information of tobacco companies during the 1960s through the 1980s. Furthermore, 
Chaloupka does not include the influence of bootlegging, differing tax rates between 
states, government legislation, and negative externalities in his analysis. Therefore, 
although Chaloupka’s research introduces the effects of cross-elasticities and substitution, 
his report implies that price is the most influential determinant of cigarette sales.  
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EFFECTS OF EXCISE TAXATION ON CIGARETTE PURCHASES IN NEW 
YORK STATE: 
According to Chaloupka, increasing taxation on cigarettes is the most effective 
way to deter cigarette sales while reducing smoking rates. As suggested by Jarvis, 
however, high cigarette prices lead to increased tax-avoidant behaviors among smokers. 
In response to tax increases, the Center for Public Health and Tobacco Policy states, 
“smokers seek untaxed sources of cigarettes in other jurisdictions, the Internet, or from 
Native American Reservations” (Cigarette Tax Evasion in New York, 2011). The 
availability of cigarettes from untaxed sources provides opportunities for tax evasion and 
trafficking of cigarettes across state borders where excise taxes are low.  
In “The Impact of Cigarette Excise Tax Increases on Purchasing Behaviors 
Among New York City Smokers,” Micaela H. Coady analyzes cigarette purchases in 
New York, where state and federal excise tax increases result in the highest cigarette 
pack price in the United States (See Page 16 – State Excise Tax Rates on Cigarettes). The 
study not only examines trends in tax-avoidant, adult smokers and their characteristics 
between 2003 and 2010 but also uses a multivariable logistic regression analysis to 
identify a correlation between a 2008 tax increase and the trafficking of cigarettes on the 
black market.  
In the study, Coady uses data from the New York City Community Health Survey 
(CHS), a population-based, random-digit-dialed telephone survey of approximately ten 
thousand adults over the age of eighteen. The CHS adapted survey questions based on the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System and incorporated questions on “current smoking, secondhand smoke exposure, 
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response to increases in cigarette taxes, and smoking cessation” (Coady 2013, 2). The 
survey was conducted in English, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese.  
From 2003 to 2010, the CHS asked one question in order to document cigarette 
purchasing and tax avoidance behaviors: “Where did you get the last cigarette that you 
smoked?” Responses for tax-avoidant purchases included “outside New York State, 
internet/mail, another person, Indian reservation, duty-free, and outside the United 
States.” Approximately 3% of respondents were not included in the study due to the 
undisclosed nature of their cigarette purchase or if the participant rolled their own 
cigarette. Other questions prompted demographic responses such as age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, education, and employment status.  
In order to assess trends in cigarette tax avoidance in New York, the study 
calculated percentages of responses and developed 95% confidence intervals for each 
year. Based on the 
results in Figure 




from 30% in 2003 
to 13% in 2007. 
Although tax avoidance decreased by 53% between 2006 and 2007, the rate of avoidance 
increased to 25% in 2008 after the cigarette tax increase in the state. The results show 
Figure 3  
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that most respondents who participated in tax-avoidant behavior received their cigarettes 
from “another person on the street.” 
In addition, Table 4 - Characteristics of Adult Smokers and Prevalence of Tax-
Avoidant Cigarette Purchases by Select Characteristics on pages 43 and 44 illustrates the 
characteristics of survey participants in New York and their relation to tax-avoidant 
purchases. In 2008, approximately 50% of smokers were between the ages of 25 and 44. 
Furthermore, more than 40% were Caucasian. Of the smokers surveyed, about 42% were 
low-income individuals and one quarter made tax-avoidant purchases in 2008. The table 
shows that tax avoidance is highest among those who bought their most recent cigarette 
from a carton versus a pack. Coady attributes this result to smokers seeking to stockpile 
cigarettes in other jurisdictions or purchasing more cartons in bulk to minimize the 
number of illegal transactions. The model also demonstrates that smokers aged 18 to 44 
were more likely than other age groups to purchase cigarettes from people on the street. 
Furthermore, in comparison to Whites, Black smokers were nine times more likely to 
purchase cigarettes on the street. In 2008, the mean price per pack for street or other tax-
avoidant forms of cigarette purchases was $5.48 compared to the state price per pack of 
$7.40. Coady affirms that the price differential is an incentive for price-sensitive smokes 
to participate in tax-avoidant behaviors.  
In addition, the 2008 excise tax increase on tobacco products in New York 
influenced consumer purchasing habits. Approximately one fifth (21%) of adult smokers 
reported buying cigarettes from street vendors while an additional 21% admitted to 
purchasing cigarettes outside New York state lines through the Internet, the mail, at an 
Indian Reservations, and at duty free shops. The study underscores the importance of 
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street vendors in the black market for untaxed cigarettes, especially among the 





































Due to the correlation between increased excise tax rates and cigarette trafficking, 
local, state, and national efforts have attempted to limit and to prevent tax-avoidance 
among smokers. In 2005, the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives required all major credit card companies and PayPal to ban payment 
processing for all tax-free, Internet cigarette sales for vendors. Similarly, the United 
States Postal Service and FedEx developed policies restricting mail orders for black 
market cigarette sales (Ribisl, 2011). In addition, under federal jurisdiction, in 2010, 
Congress enacted the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act, which imposed additional 
requirements on Internet and mail order sellers of tobacco products. Furthermore, at the 
state level, during 2011, New York State regulated cigarette wholesalers by imposing a 
state tax on tobacco products before selling them to Native American Reservations. The 
state of New York also sued retailers located on Native American Reservations for tax 
evasion resulting from the sale of cigarettes to nontribal customers. Lastly, in 2013, New 
York City filed a Citizen Petition with the Food and Drug Administration in order to 
develop a track-and-trace system that would prevent untaxed cigarettes from 
“compromising the public health benefit of excise taxes” (Citizen Petition, 2013).  
 Unlike the analysis performed by Chaloupka, Coady’s study reaffirms Jarvis’ 
position regarding the inelastic demand for cigarettes in the United States. As made 
evident by the data in New York State, excise taxes and other changes to the price per 
pack of cigarettes are not deterrents for consumer purchases. The price differential 
between taxed and non-taxed cigarettes creates incentive for price-sensitive smokers to 
participate in tax-avoidant behaviors. The availability of less expensive alternatives, as 
suggested by both Coady and Jarvis, not only creates a disincentive for smokers to quit 
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the behavior but also contributes to increased youth smoking rates. According to Coady, 
in order to decrease tax-avoidance in New York, “tax increases should be paired with 
enforcement strategies that limit the flow of untaxed, cheap cigarettes into jurisdictions 
with high cigarette prices” (Coady 2013, 9).  
 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXCISE TAXES ON 
CIGARETTES: 
As suggested by Smith and Pigou, excise or sin taxes are advantageous in 
comparison to other forms of taxation due to their predictability and easiness to 
administer. Unlike ad valorem excise taxes, the tax is not connected to the product’s price 
and therefore does not automatically adjust with inflation. As a result, government 
revenue is protected against the aforementioned price wars and manipulations outlined in 
the section entitled “Price Elasticity of Cigarettes Formulated by Tobacco Companies”. 
In regards to cigarettes, because the tax is not sensitive to price changes, the government 
can more easily budget and predict tobacco tax revenue.  
In contrast, excise taxes on specific items are less effective than ad valorem excise 
taxes and other forms of taxation because inflation erodes their value and changing the 
product can reduce collectable amount. Because there is not automatic adjustment for 
inflation on excise taxes, the government must implement additional tax rate increases. 
Without enforcement, as Coady suggests in the section entitled “Effects of Excise 
Taxation on Cigarette Consumption in New York State,” however, smokers will 
participate in tax-avoidant behavior to evade the additional imposed tax. Therefore, local, 
state, and federal revenues decrease and governments are unable to afford the costs of 
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negative externalities associated with smoking and other “sinful” behaviors. In addition, 
in order to reduce the impact of specific taxes on consumption, companies can change the 
size and composition of their product. By changing the size of the cigarette or increasing 
the size of the pack or carton, cigarette manufacturers can increase the selling price of 
their product while achieving economies of scale and lessening the burden of the imposed 
tax. In turn, due to product enhancements, consumers will purchase the product less often 
and government revenue will decrease.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
 The combination of the studies conducted by Jarvis and Coady not only 
emphasize the inelastic properties of tobacco product sales in the United States but also 
the negative effects of cigarette taxation. Although Jarvis’ analysis does not examine 
consumers’ ability to purchase cigarettes at tax-free Indian reservations, online, or 
through wholesale smuggling and the black market, the survey completed by Coady 
illustrates the implications of these sales in the state of New York. Although excise taxes 
imposed by local, state, and federal governments attempt to deter smoking behavior, 
price increases are not an effective deterrent for cigarette sales. In fact, higher prices 
incentivize consumers to participate in tax-avoidance, due to the addictive nature of 
tobacco products. If the United States federal government intends to use cigarette tax 
revenue to pay for negative externalities, such as increased health care costs, additional 
enforcement and regulation of non-taxable sales channels are required. The effects of 
cigarette taxation and regulation, as well as excise taxes in general, are relevant topics for 
!!
48 
contemporary government and policy decisions and will continue to be important for the 
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